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Will Missouri Adopt the Residual
Exception to the Hearsay Rule?
State v. Bell'
I. INTRODUCTION
A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial,
and to confront witnesses who testify against him.2 The purpose of the rules of
evidence is to facilitate ascertainment of the truth, and to assist in fair
adjudication of controversies3 by admitting relevant evidence.4 In a case of
murder, the victim may still "speak" for herself through the testimony of others,
but such evidence confronts a repeatedly insurmountable hurdle: the hearsay
rule. The hearsay rule excludes out-of-court declarations because, as such, they
cannot be subject to cross-examination.5 Therefore, the rule often wipes out as
inadmissible that which is left of the victims' lives: their out-of-court stories.
Although the out-of-court evidence is less credible than direct testimony, federal
and state laws allow for numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule.6 Such
exceptions are supposed to account for situations where the out-of-court
declarations may be no less trustworthy than direct testimony, and ought to be
admitted in order to produce a fair result.7 Nevertheless, even given these
exemptions, it still is impossible to include all the types of hearsay evidence
which may be inherently worthy of admission.
In order to deal with these situations, in both civil and criminal cases,
numerous jurisdictions have enacted one more exception to the hearsay rule: the
residual exception The exception, in criminal cases, often helps courts decide
"domestic violence" issues when the murdered victim suffered prior abuse.9
However, this exception is far from fully recognized in Missouri, despite the fact
that the Missouri Court of Appeals has considered it on several occasions."
1. 950 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. 1997).
2. U.S. CONST. amend.VI; Mo. CONST. art.I, § 18(a).
3. See generally 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 493 (1996).
4. FED. R. EviD. § 402.
5. 2 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1364(9) (James
H. Chadboum, rev. ed. 1974).
6. FED. R. EviD. 803(1-23), 804(b)(1-4).
7. See WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1422.
8. FED. R. EVID. §§ 803(24), 804(b)(5), (also called the "catch-all" or "omnibus"
exceptions).
9. Donna Meredith Matthews, Making The Crucial Connection: A Proposed Threat
Hearsay Exception, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 117, 118-19 (1997).
10. See infra note 91 and text accompanying notes 95-146.
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State v. Bell" is the first case in which the Missouri Supreme Court voiced its
position concerning the exception,'2 but it did so via the concurring opinion of
Judge Limbaugh, who was joined by three other judges.'3 When four out of
seven judges of the state's highest court speak about an unsettled issue of law,
one wonders: how long will it take for such issue to become the law?
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
On June 3, 1994, Fay Allen (Allen) called 911 and said that her husband,
Winston Bell (Bell), had set her on fire.'4 She also indicated to the police and
paramedics who came to her rescue that her husband had thrown gasoline on her
and set her on fire.'" As a consequence, Allen suffered second and third degree
burns over ninety-one percent of her body, which resulted in her death two
weeks later.' 6 Bell was charged with first degree murder."
At trial, Bell claimed that his wife had attacked him, and that, after a
struggle, she spilled gasoline on both of them and ignited it.'8 He maintained
that he managed to extinguish himself and that he tried to extinguish Allen by
pouring water on her and putting her in the shower.'9 However, the State
presented forensic evidence to challenge Bell's story and to show that there was
no struggle over the gas can, and that Allen extinguished the fire herself by
getting into the shower and removing her clothes." The State also introduced
testimony from several witnesses of numerous previous incidents of Bell's prior
abuse of Allen, and referred to such incidents as evidence of Bell's intent to kill
Allen at the time of the June 3 incident. 2' The trial court convicted Bell of
first-degree murder and sentenced him to death.' Bell appealed.'
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision and
remanded for a new trial.24 The court held that the testimony pertaining to Bell's
prior abuse of Allen constituted hearsay, which the trial court erroneously
admitted under the state-of-mind exception.' The testimony could not fit under
11. State v. Bell, 950 S.W.2d 482, 485-87 (Mo. 1997).
12. Id. at 485.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 482.
15. Id.
16. Bell, 950 S.W.2d at 482-83.
17. Id. at 482.






24. Id. at 485.
25. Id. at 482.
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the state-of-mind exception because it did not refer to "a contemporaneous
statement of fear, emotion, or any other mental condition."26 It was not a
declaration of Allen's state of mind, but a narration of past acts between her and
Bell as reported by others.27 The court concluded that the testimony greatly
increased the severity of the reported abuse by raising the number of times Bell
was alleged to have beaten her, and, consequently, prejudiced Bell's defense.28
Judge Limbaugh concurred in a separate opinion, in which Judges Price,
Robertson, and Holstein joined.29 The opinion argued for application of the
residual exception to the hearsay rule under appropriate findings by the trial
court.3° Because, prior to Bell, the issue of the residual exception to the hearsay
rule was not addressed by the Missouri Supreme Court, and because the
authorities in other jurisdictions are split on this issue, this concurring opinion
offers significant guidance for future cases attempting to apply the exception in
Missouri.
JIl. LEGAL BACKGROUND
To fully appreciate the concurring opinion in Bell, one must consider the
meaning and the use of the residual exception to the hearsay rule in Missouri3'
and in otherjurisdictions.32 It is also important to appreciate the rationale behind
the residual exception given by various courts,33 and to acknowledge the
difference in application of the exception in criminal as opposed to civil cases.34
In criminal situations, some of the issues concerning the applicability of the
exception may raise concerns of possible violation of the Confrontation Clause
of the federal Constitution.35
A. The Residual Hearsay Exception:
Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b) (5)
The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as "a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted,'3 6 and specifically enumerate
26. Bell, 950 S.W.2d at 484.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 484-85.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See infra Part III.B..
32. See infra Part III.A..
33. See infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
34. See Matthews, supra note 9, for a discussion of the importance of the residual
exception in criminal cases.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 227-51.
36. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
1998]
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the instances in which such evidence may be admitted.37 Disregarding the
"nonhearsay" exceptions, 38 hearsay evidence is inadmissible unless it falls within
one of the specifically enumerated exceptions in Rules 803 or 804."9 Rule 803
lists twenty-three specific exceptions,4 ° followed by the residual exception.4
Rule 804 lists four exceptions and then concludes with the residual exception.42
The key difference between the two rules is that Rule 804 requires the declarant
to be unavailable to testify, and Rule 803(24) does not.43 Otherwise, the
language and purpose of both the residual exceptions are identical.
4
The presence of the residual exceptions means that, even if hearsay is not
admissible under one of the enumerated exceptions, it may be admissible under
the residual exceptions, if certain conditions are met.45 Both of the residual
exceptions were designed for the peculiar cases in which clearly trustworthy
hearsay evidence ought to be admitted, even though it does not fit within the
already recognized exceptions." These two exceptions overlap in the sense that
both require the statement to: (1) be relevant; (2) have circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness equivalent to the trustworthiness of the enumerated exceptions
in Rules 803 and 804(b); (3) be more probative than any other evidence the
proponent can offer through reasonable efforts; (4) serve the interest of justice;
and (5) be preceded by a pre-trial notice to the opposing party.47
From the language and the legislative history of Rule 803(24), it appears
that Congress intended hearsay evidence to be admitted under that rule only if
the reliability of such evidence would equal or exceed the reliability of evidence
admitted under the other exceptions.' Therefore, the residual exceptions clearly
were designed to equip the courts with the flexibility to address unusual fact
situations.49
As stated above, courts consider five requirements in order to establish the
residual exception: trustworthiness, materiality, probativeness, satisfaction of the
37. FED. R. EviD. 803(1-23), 804(b)(1-4).
38. FED. R. Evin. 801(d)(1-2).
39. FED. R. EVID. 802.
40. FED. R. EviD. 803(3).
41. FED. R. EviD. 8(24).
42. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
43. See 11 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 803 (2d ed.
1982).
44. Id.
45. See FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
46. FED. R. EVID. 803(1-23), 804(b)(1-4).
47. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
48. One of Congress' intents in adopting the residual exception was to avoid the
distortion of the enumerated exceptions beyond the rational circumstances for which they
were designed. See Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, S.Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7051, 7065-66; MOORE, supra
note 43.
49. 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 264 (1996).
[Vol. 63
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interests of justice, and notice. s° The first requirement frequently results in three
distinct approaches to examining trustworthiness: (1) only from circumstances
which surround the testimony; (2) through both surrounding circumstances and
extrinsic corroboration; and (3) only through extrinsic corroboration.51 The first
approach considers exclusively the circumstances which surround the
statement.52 For example in Karme v. Commissioner,3 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals admitted Karme's bank records because, in the court's opinion, they
satisfied the "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" simply because they
were bank records taken from a remotely located bank.54 No corroboration was
necessary to support their veracity."
The second approach looks at both the circumstances which surround the
testimony and the extrinsic factors. For example, in United States v. Van
LuJkins, 7 Van Lufldns was convicted of assault and claimed that the court
erroneously admitted, as lacking "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,"
hearsay statements which the victim made to an FBI agent and to the victim's
sister.-8 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found the statements trustworthy
because they had been made directly after the incident and were corroborated by
other FBI evidence.5 9
The third approach concentrates exclusively on the analysis of outside
factors and ignores the circumstances surrounding the testimony: ° For example,
in United States v. Barnes,6' Barnes was convicted of conspiracy to import and
possess cocaine with intent to distribute.62 The prosecution introduced the
confession of Barnes' codefendant, which incriminated Barnes.63 Barnes argued
that the court erred when it did not give instructions to the jury that would limit
such evidence only for impeachment." The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
found the evidence admissible and held that it satisfied the requirements of the
50. See FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b)(5); MOORE, supra note 43. All five factors
were intended to be restraints on the power ofjudges to admit hearsay which would not
fit into the enumerated exceptions. Id.
51. James E. Beaver, The Residual Hearsay Exception Reconsidered, 20 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 787 (1993).
52. Id. at 796.
53. 673 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1982).
54. Id. at 1065.
55. Id.
56. Beaver, supra note 51, at 796.
57. 676 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1982).
58. Id. at 1191.
59. Id.
60. Beaver, supra note 51, at 796.
61. 586 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1978).
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"circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," because the declarant not only
was available, but in fact testified at trial.65
The second and third requirements to establish the residual exception
pertain to the statement's materiality and probativeness.66 These requirements
usually are met when the facts to which the hearsay statement refers otherwise
would be lost, or when evidence of the same value cannot be obtained from
another source.67 The fourth requirement pertains to the interest of justice and
can be satisfied relatively easily.
68
The fifth requirement is one of advance notice. According to the Federal
Rules, notice needs to be made "sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare."69 However, the
courts have not been consistent in finding sufficient notice.7" Some have adhered
to the requirement literally, expecting notice before trial,7' while others accept
notice after the trial has begun.72
Despite the detailed consideration given by some courts to the above
mentioned elements, the courts' usual analysis of the residual exception
concentrates on two basic elements: (1) the trustworthiness of hearsay; and (2)
its necessity." The inquiry pertaining to the trustworthiness prong focuses on
the numerous factors supporting reliability of the testimony. For example, such
factors may be: (a) the probable motivation of the declarant in making the
statement; (b) the surrounding circumstances under which the statement was
made; and (c) the knowledge and qualifications of the declarant.74 The
65. Id. at 1055.
66. Beaver, supra note 51, at 796.
67. Noble v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 872 F.2d 361, 366 (1 lth Cir.
1989). See also 2 MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE, § 324, at 365-66 (4th ed. 1992); 31A
C.J.S. Evidence § 264 (1996).
68. United States v. Woolbright, 831 F.2d 1390, 1396-97 (8th Cir. 1987). See also
Cook v. Hoppin, 783 F.2d 684, 690-91 (7th Cir. 1986).
69. FED. R. EvID. 803(24).
70. Beaver, supra note 51, at 798.
71. Beaver, supra note 51, at 798 (citing Wilander v. McDermott Int'l, Inc., 887
F.2d 88, 92 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Wilkus, 875 F.2d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Cowley, 720 F.2d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 1983); Johnson v. William C.
Ellis & Sons Iron Works, Inc., 609 F.2d 820, 823 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 358 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 72 n.30
(2d Cir. 1977)).
72. Beaver, supra note 51, at 798 (citing United States v. Panzardi-Lespier, 918
F.2d 313, 317 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Calkins, 906 F.2d 1240, 1245 (8th Cir.
1990); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1553 (9th Cir.
1989); United States v. Chapman, 866 F.2d 1326, 1332 (11 th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Doe, 860 F.2d 488,492 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 348 (3d
Cir. 1978); United States v. Iaconetti, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976)).
73. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
74. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Residual Hearsay Exception Where Declarant
[Vol. 63
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trustworthiness prong usually is satisfied when the courts find that the testimony
was made with "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."" For example,
in United States v. Iaconetti,76 Iaconetti was found guilty of soliciting and
accepting a bribe and of attempting to extort money from a government
supplier.77 His testimony and the supplier's testimony were contradictory
regarding who offered and who requested a bribe.78 Iaconetti challenged the
testimony of witnesses who stated that the supplier had told them about the bribe
request immediately after laconetti had made it.79 The court concluded that such
hearsay testimony was both reliable and necessary because it was made with
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. The statement was made
immediately after the event, to the appropriate persons, and by a declarant who
was available for cross-examination."0  The evidence was relevant,
non-prejudicial and admissible under the residual exception.8
In State v. Sharpe," Sharpe was convicted of attempted murder and
assault." On the morning of the crime, a victim's neighbor saw two men in a car
near the victim's house. 4 Since it was strange for the car to be parked there at
about 6:30 a.m., the neighbor wrote down its license number. When he later
learned about the crime, the neighbor reported the number and the description
of the car to the police.8" Sharpe objected, claiming that such hearsay evidence
did not fall under any of the hearsay exceptions.86 The Connecticut Court of
Appeals agreed that the evidence indeed did not satisfy any of the traditional
exceptions, but it admitted the evidence under a residual exception similar to the
exceptions found in the Federal Rules of Evidence.87 The court decided that the
necessity requirement was satisfied, because the same evidence could not have
been obtained from other sources.88
Unavailable: Uniform Evidence Rule 804(b)(5), 75 A.L.R.4th 199, 200-02 (1990).
75. Zitter, supra note 74, at 200-02.
76. 406 F. Supp. 554,559 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). See also MCCORMICK, supra note 67,
at 362-65; 29 AM. JUR. 2D, Evidence § 685 (1994); F.T.C. v' Figgie Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d
595, 608 (9th Cir. 1993).





82. 491 A.2d 345 (Conn. 1985).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 353-54.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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B. The Residual Hearsay Exception:
Missouri Evidence Law
The Missouri evidentiary rules have developed through caselaw and various
statutes.89 Missouri has not expressly adopted a residual exception analogous to
the exceptions found in Federal Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5)." However, some
permutations of the Rule 803(24) exception have been addressed in a few
cases.9 The residual exception comparable to Rule 804(b)(5) has not been
recognized in Missouri at all.9" Consequently, interpretations of the residual
exception are very scarce and they come almost exclusively from child abuse
cases.93 Also, until Bell there were no pronouncements regarding the residual
exception by the Missouri Supreme Court.
1. Missouri Case Law
There are five Missouri non-child abuse cases decided by the Missouri
Court of Appeals dealing with some permutation of the residual exception.94 In
Liberty Financial Management Co., v. Beneficial Data Processing Co.,9s the
issue concerned hearsay information generated by a survey of company
employees pertaining to their time spent on computers.96 The court of appeals
concluded that the fact that the evidence was hearsay did not "automatically
mandat[e its] exclusion from the consideration of the trier of fact."'97 The court
stated:
89. See State v. Luster, 750 S.W.2d 474 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Boliek, 706
S.W.2d 847 (Mo. 1986).
90. FED. R. EVID. 803(24); 804(b)(5).
91. These cases may be divided into child abuse and non-child abuse cases. The
former are: Moore v. Director of Revenue, 811 S.W.2d 848 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); State
v. Parker, 817 S.W.2d 920 (Mo. Ct. App, 1991); Nickels v. Nickels, 817 S.W.2d 632
(Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Albers v. Hemphill Contracting Co., 740 S.W.2d 660 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987); Liberty Fin. Management Corp., v. Beneficial Data Processing Corp., 670
S.W.2d 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
The latter are: K.J.B. v C.A.B., 883 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); State v.
Daugherty, 823 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); D.L.H. v. H.T.H., 780 S.W.2d 104 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1989); Hord v. Morgan, 769 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); In re W.J.D.,
756 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); In re S.M. v. M.W.S.M., 750 S.W.2d 650 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1988); In re Marriage of P.K.A. v. J.E.A., 725 S.W.2d 78 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
92. See infra notes 115-16, 169.
93. FED. R. EVID. 803(24); 804(b)(5).
94. FED. R. EVID. 803(24); 804(b)(5).
95. 670 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
96. Id. at 53-54.
97. Id. at 53.
(Vol. 63
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[W]e address the question whether the trial court erred in admitting into
evidence the results of the survey and the expert opinion drawn from those
results. The parties have cited us to no conclusive Missouri authority on the
point, and our own research has yielded none. We are persuaded, however,
by common sense and reason that it is proper to allow into evidence surveys
which meet fundamental requirements of necessity and trustworthiness for the
purpose of providing the foundation for an expert opinion such as that elicited
here.98
Similarly, in Albers v. Hemphill Contracting Co.,9 9 the court of appeals
regarded an audit summary concerning the.company's business records as
"trustworthy, necessary and properly accepted" to be the basis for the expert
testimony."0
In two other cases, Moore v. Director ofRevenue,'0 ' and State v. Parker,'02
the courts dealt with the issue of admissibility of blood test results. In Moore,
the defendant's driving privileges were suspended after he had been arrested for
driving while intoxicated.' 3 He objected to the results of the blood test, claiming
that the test was improperly administered and rendered incompetent evidence. '
He argued that the phlebotomist who used a prepackaged, unopened needle and
vacuum tube, which were labeled as "sterile," did not otherwise prove that they
were in fact sterile." 5 The court held that the facts as presented by the hospital
and by the phlebotomist, were sufficient to establish a "circumstantial probability
of trustworthiness," and the evidence was competent.'0 6 The court relied heavily
on the evidence concerning statements on the label and packaging, as to the
content and condition of the needle and the tube,' 7 but in considering
trustworthiness of the packaged and labeled equipment, the court also took into
account the consequences of questioning such evidence. It stated that if it held
otherwise:
[A]n array of witnesses would be required to establish qualitative analyses of
substances as well as production control and packaging in order for the items
to be admissible in evidence. At best, but for admitting labels as evidence of
the identity and condition of items, gross inconvenience would occur. At
worst, items requiring such testimony would, in all practicality, not be
98. Id. at 54 (emphasis added).
99. 740 S.W.2d 660 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
100. Id. at 663.
101. 811 S.W.2d 848 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
102. 817 S.W.2d 920 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
103. Moore, 811 S.W.2d at 848.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 850.
106. Id.
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admissible because of the difficulty or impossibility of securing the presence
of witnesses. 08
The court concluded that the facts supported the admission of such evidence as
"sufficiently reliable and trustworthy on their face to be considered an exception
to the hearsay rule."'" 9
In contrast, in State v. Parker,"0 the results of a blood test were deemed
inadmissible because the evidence, as to whether the needle and vessel used to
draw the blood were sterile and unused, came entirely from the testimony of a
police officer and a blood specialist."' The court of appeals failed to find
"circumstantial probability of trustworthiness" concerning such evidence."'
In the fifth Missouri non-child abuse case addresing the residual exception
issue, Nickels v. Nickels,"' the subject matter concerned tax returns. The court
of appeals found the defendant's hearsay evidence to be inadmissible."' It held
that although the evidence might, arguably, fall under the "omnibus" (residual)
exception, the court had to reject it because, as the court stated, "[This state has
adopted no similar rule as contained in the Federal Rules ofEvidence.... We
find no Missouri case which specifically discusses the 'omnibus exception.""' 5
Also, the court found "no language in Liberty which leads us to conclude that
Missouri has adopted the 'omnibus exception' to the hearsay rule. Rather, we
view Liberty as standing for the proposition that an expert witness may rely on
hearsay evidence.., in forming a basis for his opinion.""' 6
In addition to the above cases in the courts of appeals, the Missouri
Supreme Court spoke on the general issue of hearsay exceptions in Bynote v.
National Super Markets, Inc.' '7 It stated that, in general, hearsay statements are
excluded by the Missouri courts because they are not subject to
cross-examination, presented under oath, or "subject to the fact finder's ability
to judge demeanor at the time the statement is made.""'  However, the
exceptions to the hearsay rule may apply when the "circumstances conspire to
assure the trustworthiness of the declarant's statement."'" 9
Since the mid-1980s, a trend has developed in Missouri statutory and case
law toward increased flexibility in admission of statements made by a child to
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 817 S.W.2d 920 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
111. Id. at 921.
112. Id.
113. 817 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
114. Id. at 639-40.
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Id.
117. 891 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. 1995).
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others, especially in child abuse cases. 2 The rationale for admitting such
statements, even though they would be hearsay, was well explained in In re
Marriage ofP.KA. v. J.E.A. ' There, a father argued that his child's statements
made to the child's mother and the child's psychologist, which indicated that the
father had sexually abused the child, were inadmissible hearsay." The court of
appeals created a special hearsay exception designed to admit such statements
in a case of necessity."' 3 It stated:
Where the best interest of the child is the primary concern, we believe that the
courts should consider those statements for their truth .... This type of abuse
would not often occur in the presence of persons competent to testify. Where
there is a substantial basis to believe that the statements of the child are true,
courts are justified in hearing and considering them to prevent further or
potential abuse to a child.... Flexibility is needed in these cases, even where
the child might be qualified to testify, because of the emotional trauma that
such an experience may cause. It is desirable to avoid the necessity of forcing
a young child to testify as to abuse, particularly when the abuser is the
victim's parent. This exception should support efforts to prevent child abuse.
It is to be used only where abuse may have occurred, or has been threatened,
and the child might not be competent or reasonably expected to testify to it. 24
In another case involving the special exception, In re S.M. v. M. W.S.M.,"
a father challenged as inadmissible his son's statements made to several
witnesses, that the father sexually abused him. 2s The court of appeals took into
consideration both the P.K.A. exception, 27 and the public policy of the state
pertaining to sexual abuse, as clearly reflected in the Missouri statutes, 28 and
held that the statements were properly admitted. 29 The same result was reached
inln re WJ.D. & H.R.D.,30 where the court of appeals was persuaded to admit
the statements made by two sexually abused girls because their father not only
failed to object to the girls' testimony, but himself injected the girls' statements
by putting their psychologist on the stand.'
120. See supra note 93.
121. 725 S.W.2d 78 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
122. Id. at 80.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 81.
125. 750 S.W,2d 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
126. Id. at 653-55.
127. Id. at 653.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 655.
130. 756 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
131. Id. at 196.
EVIDENCE1998]
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The P.KA. exception132 was expanded in Hord v. Morgan.' There, a
father challenged the admissibility of testimony concerning his son's statements
made to the mother's friend, that the father physically and emotionally abused
him.M The court of appeals followed the holding in P.K.A. 3 ' and reasoned that
the P.K.A. exception to the hearsay rule in sexual abuse, civil, non-jury cases
also should apply to situations of physical and emotional abuse. The court stated
that "[t]he goal of the exception is to prevent child abuse and to attempt to
alleviate the consequent trauma that a child may experience through
testifying.' ' 136
In another case considering the P.K.A. exception, D.L.H. v.H.T.H.,' 37 a
mother challenged the trial court's decision declining to admit testimony of a
therapist who examined her son after the mother had found him engaging in a
sexually inappropriate activity. 38 Although the court of appeals agreed with the
mother and found the trial court decision erroneous, it held that the refusal to
admit the testimony was not prejudicial.1 9
Finally, in State v. Daugherty,4 the court of appeals also acknowledged the
P.K.A. 14' exception, but because the child testified, it did not find necessity for
its application. 42
One of the most recent non-jury child abuse cases concerning a hearsay
exception was KJ.B. v. C.A.B 43 There, the trial court allowed hearsay
testimony from both parents concerning their son's relationships with other
family members,44 and gave the defendant, the father, an opportunity to
extensively cross-examine witnesses who testified about the son's statements.' 4
The court of appeals did not find improper reliance on the hearsay evidence by
the trial court and sustained its judgment.'"
132. See supra text accompanying notes 121-24.




137. 780 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
138. Id. at 104.
139. Id. at 106.
140. 823 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
141. Id. at 36.
142. Id.
143. 883 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).









The Missouri General Assembly has codified the law of admission of the
following out-of-court statements of a child victim: (1) statements pertaining to
the occurrence of particular crimes; (2) statements concerning other sexual
abuse; and (3) statements indicating physical or emotional abuse. First, Section
491.075 47 controls admissibility of statements made by a child under twelve
years of age relating to offenses falling under Chapters 565,148 566,49 or 568,150
which otherwise would be inadmissible either under statute or under court
rule.'5 ' Such statements are deemed admissible "as substantive evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted."' 52 Such statements are admissible under
Section 491.075, provided that the time, the content, and the circumstances of
the statement meet "sufficient indicia of reliability," and the child either: (1)
testifies at the proceeding; (2) is unavailable as a witness; or (3) is physically
available but the court finds that "significant emotional or psychological trauma"
would result from testifying in the presence of the defendant.'53
Second, Section 492.304154 controls admissibility of a visual or aural
recording of the statement made by a child under twelve years of age and
concerning crimes which fall under Chapters 565, 566, and 568,55 regardless of
whether the child is available to testify.
156
Third, like Section 492.304,' Section 491.68058 controls admission of
visual evidence regarding children under the age of seventeen when the court
finds that the child would suffer such significant trauma from testifying in the
presence of the defendant, that the child is deemed unavailable as a witness. 59
Finally, under Section 491.075.1,6 the court may admit a reliable out-of-court
statement by a child under the age of twelve, who witnessed an offense
147. Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.075 (1994).
148. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 565.001-565.257 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (offenses against
the person).
149. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 566.010-566.625 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (sexual offenses).
150. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 568.010-568.175 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (offenses against
the family).
151. Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.075 (1994).
152. Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.075 (1994).
153. Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.075 (1994). See also State v. Redman, 916 S.W.2d
787 (Mo. 1996); State v. Silvey, 894 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. 1995).
154. Mo. REv. STAT. § 492.304 (1994).
155. See supra notes 148-51.
156. Mo. REV. STAT. § 492.304 (1994). See also State v. Schaal, 806 S.W.2d 659
(Mo. 1991); State v. Crossland, 820 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
157. Mo. REv. STAT. § 492.304 (1994).
158. Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.680 (1994).
159. Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.680 (1994).
160. Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.075.1 (1994).
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chargeable under Chapters 565, 566, and 568.161 Section 491.075.1 applies
when the crime is "performed with or on a child by another" and: (1) the child
testifies; (2) the child is unavailable; or (3) the court finds that a significant
emotional or psychological trauma would result from testifying in the presence
of the defendant."
3. The State of the Residual Hearsay Exception Before Bell
In addition to the above statutory provisions and the P.KA.-type exception
designed for civil, non-jury proceedings involving issues of possible sexual child
abuse, 63 Missouri case law allows for an additional exception to the rule that the
evidence of "prior, unswom, extrajudicial complaints... outside the res gestae"
is ordinarily inadmissible hearsay,' in prosecutions involving cases of rape 65
and other sex crimes.'66
The above discussion reveals that the residual hearsay exception has been
imprecisely defined by the Missouri courts.' 67 The most comprehensive
explanation of the exception, and probably the most accurate determination of
its uncertain status in Missouri was given by the court of appeals in Nickels v.
Nickels. 68 The court clearly rejected the defendant's arguments that the
exception had been recognized in this state. 169 Some of the other courts felt
uneasy about denominating the exceptions which they applied as residual, and
referred to them as "special." Such courts usually based their application of the
exception on the notion of necessity to receive the hearsay statements "for their
truth,"' 70 or applied the exception when they found that the statements met the
"circumstantial probability of trustworthiness."
In addition, two secondary authorities on Missouri law of evidence offer
interpretations of the residual exception. Missouri Evidence Restated.' defines
the exception as "[a] statement having circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, where, in the interest of justice, the court deems admission is a
161. See supra notes 148-51.
162. Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.075.1 (1994). See also State v. Foote, 791 S.W.2d 879
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 121-24 and 147-62.
164. See State v. Richardson, 163 S.W.2d 956 (1942).
165. Id. at 960.
166. See State v. Smith, 540 S.W.2d 189 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
167. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
168. 817 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
169. Id. at 637-40.
170. These are the child abuse cases in which this language resembled the statutory
language.
171. MissouRi EVIDENCE RESTATED (2d ed. 1993).
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necessity. ' Missouri Evidence73 states more generally that "[a] declaration
not specifically covered by any formally classified exception but which has
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness is admissible if the
interests of justice will be served by its admission, and if the statement is more
probative than any other reasonably available evidence of the same matter."'74
It is uncertain whether the Missouri courts will remain satisfied with the
two-prong, necessity-trustworthiness test; or embrace more comprehensive
examination of the elements of the exemption.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Bell73 court began its analysis by focusing on the arguments justifying
the admission, under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, of evidence
concerning Allen's statements to third persons of prior abuse by Bell. 76 The
state argued for admission of the testimony based on the present state-of-mind
exception to the hearsay rule.177 The court acknowledged that, in general,
statements of the declarant's present mental condition, made out of court, are
excepted from the hearsay rule, and may be admissible, provided that their
relevance is greater than their prejudicial impact. 78 By contrast, statements
merely reciting past events are barred. 179 The court stated that such bar stems
from the logic expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Shepard v. United
States,8 in which declarations of memory reciting past events were prohibited,
but declarations of future intention were allowed. 8 The court acknowledged
that such distinction is recognized by the Missouri courts as well.'82
The court concluded that the testimony which referred to Allen's statements
neither reported her contemporaneous statements of emotion nor her current
thoughts, feelings, or intentions. 83- The statements were, then, pure narration of
172. MISSOURI EVIDENCE RESTATED, supra note 171, § 803(24).
173. I MISSOURI EVIDENCE (4th ed. 1993).
174. I MISSOURI EVIDENCE, supra note 173, § 8.29.
175. State v. Bell, 950 S.W.2d 482, 483 (Mo. 1997).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. See State v. Boliek, 706 S.W.2d 847, 850 (Mo. 1986); State v. Ford, 639
S.W.2d 573, 575 (Mo. 1982); State v. Benson, 142 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Mo. 1940); State v.
Pagano, 882 S.W.2d 326,336 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Singh, 586 S.W.2d 410,417
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Randolph, 698 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985);
State v. Miller, 664 S.W.2d 229, 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Shepard v. United States, 290
U.S. 96, 106 (1933).
179. Bell, 950 S.W.2d at 484.
180. 290 U.S. 96 (1933).
181. Bell, 950 S.W.2d at 484.
182. Bell, 950 S.W.2d at 484 n.8 (citing State v. Benson, 142 S.W.2d at 54 (Mo.
1940)).
183. Id. at 484.
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past events.'" Thus, the statements did not fit the exception and constituted
inadmissible hearsay.' The court determined that the trial court abused its
discretion by permitting such hearsay evidence to be presented to the jury.'
Next, the court turned to the issue of prejudice.8 7 It indicated that
according to Missouri law, when the trial court abused its discretion, reversal
would follow only when such abuse had prejudiced the defendant.' The court
noted that prejudice occurs when a reasonable probability exists that, but for the
abuse, the verdict would have been different.' 9 Then, the court analyzed the
trial records and found a substantial imbalance between the scarcity of the state's
evidence to prove Bell's intent to kill Allen, including his deliberation before
setting her on fire, and the abundance of the state's evidence of his prior abuse."
Therefore, the court determined that frequent use by the state of the testimony
revealing Bell's previous abuse' was supposed to overshadow its lack of
evidence that Bell intended to kill Allen on June 3d. Given such imbalance,
there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been
different if the hearsay evidence had been excluded. 93 Consequently, since there
was a reasonable probability of prejudice at the trial, 94 the court reversed the
trial court's decision and remanded for a new trial.'95
A. Concurring Opinion
Judge Limbaugh wrote a concurring opinion in which Judges Price,
Robertson and Holstein joined.'96 Judge Limbaugh focused on the residual
exception to the hearsay rule and argued for its adoption by the Missouri
courts.'97 Judge Limbaugh began by expressing his dissatisfaction with the
unjust result generated by the holding of the case.'98 First, he was troubled that
otherwise probative and trustworthy evidence was inadmissible under the state-
of-mind exception, and argued for adoption of the residual exception in the
state.'99 Then, he recognized two elements of the residual exception: (1) the
184. Id. at 484-85.
185. Id.




190. Id. at 484-85.








199. Bell, 950 S.W.2d at 485.
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necessity of admitting otherwise inadmissible hearsay; and (2) the presence of
factors which support trustworthiness of such hearsay.2 "° He concluded that
necessity would demand of the evidence that it concern a material fact, and be
of such probative value that would otherwise be unattainable by the party
seeking to introduce it.201 Trustworthiness, in turn, would demand factors which
bolster the reliability of the proposed hearsay,20 2 including "the motivation for
speaking truthfully, the timing of the statement, the basis of the declarant's
knowledge, the spontaneity of the statement, and the circumstances surrounding
the statement.,
20 3
Subsequently, Judge Limbaugh remarked upon the inherent limitations of
the traditional hearsay exceptions."' He noted that the exceptions were designed
to cover specific circumstances in which the evidence was anticipated to be
trustworthy but they could not include all possible circumstances of such
trustworthiness. 5 Therefore, the residual exception was introduced to
compensate for that limitation and allow courts to consider hearsay evidence
which would otherwise be inadmissible under the traditional exceptions. 20 6
Then, Judge Limbaugh explained the grounds upon which possible adoption of
the residual hearsay exception by the Missouri courts might be based. First, he
focused on the issue of trustworthiness 20 7 and pointed to Bynote"8 for direction
regarding when the exceptions to the hearsay rule might apply in Missouri.2"
Next, he looked to the Missouri Court of Appeals' occasional admission of
hearsay for which none of the established exceptions applied,21 and found that,
especially in many child abuse cases,2 such otherwise inadmissible hearsay was
admitted because the courts were persuaded by the "circumstantial probability
of trustworthiness," or because the statements "spoke for their truth."2 , Judge
Limbaugh concluded that acceptance of the residual hearsay exception in
Missouri on the grounds of trustworthiness would be "consistent with the







206. Id. (citing FED. R. EVwD. 803(24) (advisory committee's note); 31A C.J.S.
Evidence § 264 (1996); Nowell v. Universal Elec. Co., 792 F.2d 1310, 1314 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986)).
207. Id.
208. 891 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Mo. 1995).
209. Bell, 950 S.W.2d at 486.
210. Id. (citing Moore v. Director of Revenue, 811 S.W.2d 848, 852 (Mo. Ct. App.
1991); State v. Parker, 817 S.W.2d 920, 921 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)).
211. Id.
212. The phrase commonly used in child abuse cases.
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exceptions. 213 He also indicated that such acceptance would constitute a
reasonable solution to the dilemma courts face when they look for an exception
to admit the trustworthy hearsay not covered by any other exception." 4
Then, Judge Limbaugh argued how application of the exception arguably
would necessitate reaching a different result in the instant case.21 He referred
to the issues of materiality and of probative value generated by the evidence
concerning Bell's prior abuse of Allen,2"6 and stated that, by using that evidence,
the state was able to convincingly weaken Bell's defense of accident.2"7 He
further elaborated on the issue of reliability and trustworthiness of that evidence,
concluding that it "met all the requirements of the residual hearsay exception,
and had the trial court the benefit of the exception, the evidence would have
properly been admitted."2 ' Nonetheless, Judge Limbaugh refrained from
invoking the exception in the instant case because the trial court was a more
appropriate place to determine issues of "materiality, probative value, reliability,
and trustworthiness" of the evidence.2"9 He concluded that it should be within
the trial court's discretion to admit or to refuse hearsay evidence under the
residual exception."
Finally, having exculpated the state for not arguing for application of the
residual exception,"' Judge Limbaugh agreed that it would, indeed, be erroneous
to expand the state-of-mind exception to include the evidence which was clearly
beyond its scope.'
V. COMMENT
The residual exception to the hearsay rule was designed to admit various
evidence. However, the residual exception is controversial. '  The criticisms
213. Bell, 950 S.W.2d at 486.
214. Id. at 486-87.





220. Bell, 950 S.W.2d at 486 (citing 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 702 (1994)).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. For criticisms of the exception, see Beaver, supra note 51; Myma S. Raeder,
The Effect Of The Catchalls On Criminal Defendants: Little Red Riding Hood Meets The
Hearsay Wolf And Is Devoured, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 925 (1992). For a more
sympathetic analysis of the exception, see Zitter, supra note 74; Matthews, supra note
9; Joseph W. Rand, Note, The Residual Exceptions To The Federal Hearsay Rule: The
Futile and Misguided Attempt To Restrain Judicial Discretion, 80 GEo. L.J. 873 (1992);
John Norman Scott, Michigan Catches Up To The "Catch-Alis ": How Much Hearsay
Will They Catch?, 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 1 (1997).
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concerning it are of general and specific nature.' The general criticisms refer
to the threats the exception represents to federal and state constitutional
provisions, namely the defendant's right to confront witnesses under the Sixth
Amendment.' The specific criticisms refer to possible abuses of the various
elements of the exception by the courts during the process of their application. 6
The most likely constitutional controversy that may be triggered by
application of the residual exception can best be illustrated by the Congressional
debate concerning the exception. 7 The debate focused on the issues pertaining
to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.? Representative Holtzman, who opposed
adoption of the residual exceptione 9 stated that the exception:
basically abolishes the rules against hearsay and leaves it to the discretion of
every judge to let in any kind of hearsay that he wants. This is true for
criminal as well as civil cases. One of the basic assumptions in our system of
jurisprudence is that the defendant in criminal trials has the right to confront
his accuser. To abolish all prohibitions against hearsay really abridges our
concept of a fair trial, aside from creating some Sixth Amendment
problems."3
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with
the witnesses against him."" As interpreted, the clause does not forbid the
admission of hearsay statements against a criminal defendant. 32 In 1970, the
United States Supreme Court distinguished between the prohibition of hearsay
statements based on the Confrontation Clause and prohibition of such statements
based on the hearsay rules. 3 A decade later, in Ohio v. Roberts,"4 the United
States Supreme Court did not accept the view that the Confrontation Clause
would bar use of any out-of-court statement when the declarant was
unavailable.23' The Court held that the Sixth Amendment established a rule of
necessity, which demanded that the prosecutor either produce the declarant
whose testimony is to be used against the defendant or demonstrate that such
224. See generally Beaver, supra note 51.
225. See generally Beaver, supra note 51, at 806-11.
226. See generally Beaver, supra note 51, at 806-11.
227. See Raeder, supra note 223, at 925 (discussing the debates).
228. Id.
229. Id. (referring to FED. R. Evnm. 804(b)(5)).
230. See Raeder, supra note 223, at 925 (discussing the debates).
231. U.S. CONST. amend.VI.
232. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895). See also Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965).
233. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970).
234. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
235. Id. at 64.
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declarant is unavailable. 6 Once unavailability of the declarant is demonstrated,
the declarant's statement would be available only if 'it bears adequate indicia
of reliability."' 7 While the reliability can be accepted without additional
requirements in cases in which the evidence falls within firmly established
hearsay exceptions, such reliability in other cases requires "a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." z 8
Similarly, in Lee v. illinois,2 9 the United States Supreme Court held,
"[E]ven if certain hearsay evidence does not fall within 'a firmly rooted hearsay
exception' and is thus presumptively unreliable and inadmissible for
Confrontation Clause purposes, it may nonetheless meet Confrontation Clause
reliability standards if it is supported by a 'showing of particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness.,"'
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court faced the residual exception issue
in Idaho v Wright.24" There, Wright and Giles were convicted in a state court of
two counts of lewd conduct with Wright's two young daughters. 2 The issue
was whether the incriminating statement that one of the children had made to a
doctor satisfied the standard of "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."4 3
The doctor failed to videotape the interview, employed leading questions, and
approached the interview with a preconceived notion of what the child was
likely to say.2 " Since the Idaho residual hearsay exception under which the
challenged statements were admitted, was not one of the firmly rooted hearsay
exceptions, the evidence was presumptively unreliable and inadmissible for
Confrontation Clause purposes.245 The Court agreed with the prosecution that
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness must be shown from the totality of
the circumstances, but it limited the relevant circumstances to only those which
"surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly
worthy of belief."' The Court also stated that the hearsay rule would not bar
admission of the statement, if the declarant's truthfulness was so clear from the
surrounding circumstances that subjecting him to cross-examination would be
superfluous. 7 The Wright Court rejected the notion that the "evidence
corroborating the truth of a hearsay statement may properly support a finding
236. Id. at 65.
237. Id. at 66.
238. Id.
239. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
240. Id. at 543.
241. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
242. Id. at 812.
243. Id. at 815.
244. Id. at 812-13.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 813.
247. Id. at 820.
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that the statement bears 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,"'248 and
held that in order to be admitted under the Confrontation Clause, the hearsay
evidence had to "possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent
trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial."249 However, since
the Confrontation Clause was the basis for the Wright decision, the Court's
holding governs only hearsay evidence submitted by the prosecution in criminal
cases. Wright leaves open the question of whether corroboration may help
establish the trustworthiness of the hearsay evidence presented either by a
criminal defendant or by either of the parties to a civil trial. Such query
concerning criminal defendants may be partially answered by Chambers v.
Mississippi,250 in which the failure to apply the hearsay exception to admit
evidence that was corroborated by other evidence resulted in reversal because
it deprived the defendant of a fair trial."
Some commentators point to the possible abuses in the application of
various elements of the residual hearsay exception. 2  They say that the
exception has been used without the requirements of findings of fact, clear and
convincing evidence of trustworthiness, and necessity. 3 They also claim that
the requirement of materiality has been treated synonymously with relevance, or
that the requirement that evidence serve the "interests of justice," simply
reaffirms a discretionary role of the judge. 4 According to them, the meaning
of "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" has always been imprecise, and
the requirement of adequate notice treated very flexibly. 5 Moreover, the critics
maintain that the exception allows the "near misses" to be used against the
defendants in criminal cases, when by a "near miss" they mean a situation in
which the evidence "just falls short of a recognized hearsay exception."' 6
Finally, they are bothered by the discretionary application of the residual
exception, which results in unpredictability as to when and how it may be
used.2 The only meaningful threshold for admission of hearsay evidence under
the residual exception is, according to the critics, that the evidence needs to be
248. Id. at 822.
249. Id. (emphasis added).
250. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
251. Id.
252. Raeder, supra note 223, at 935-39.
253. Raeder, supra note 223, at 936.
254. Raeder, supra note 223, at 936.
255. Raeder, supra note 223, at 936
256. Raeder, supra note 223, at 936-37. Examples of such otherwise inadmissible
hearsay which get admitted under the residual exceptions are: (1) the grand jury
testimony of an unavailable witness; (2) child testimony which is not excited utterance;
or (3) quasi-business records which do not meet Rule 803(6) requirements. Raeder,
supra note 223, at 936-37.
257. Raeder, supra note 223, at 936-37.
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more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that
can be acquired through reasonable means." 8
Given these condemnations of the exception, why was it embraced by the
four judges of the Missouri Supreme Court in Bell? In Bell, the issue on appeal
was whether the trial court abused its discretion to the extent of prejudicing Bell
by admitting, under the state-of-mind exception, the evidence which concerned
Allen's statements to third persons of prior abuse by him."' Considering the
abundance of Missouri law pertaining to the state-of-mind exception, and the
issue of prejudice against a criminal defendant, the only sensible result had to
follow the precedent of Bell's much earlier predecessor, State v. Miller.2" There,
Miller was tried for stabbing his wife.26' He claimed that she initiated
confrontation with him and that the stabbing was accidental. 262 The state
introduced testimony of a witness who testified that several years earlier the
victim had told the witness that Miller violently attacked her.263 The state argued
that the statements should be admissible under the state-of-mind exception.2"
The Missouri Supreme Court concluded that, since "the nature of the evidence
[was such that the] defendant had no opportunity to confront the declarant or to
cross-examine her,, 265 the witness' statements "redirected the entire... trial to
the question of the defendant's culpability for a broken tooth, a broken arm....
and away from the issue of guilt or innocence., 266 Admission of such evidence
resulted in a highly prejudicial trial.267
But for the concurring opinion, the Missouri Supreme Court's holding in
Bell would be indistinguishable from Miller. Departing from Miller in Bell
would have undermined the soundness of evidentiary principles. Thus, the
Missouri Supreme Court rightfully followed the Miller precedent. However,
assuming that the purpose of the evidentiary regime is to "facilitate
ascertainment of truth," the concurring opinion of Judge Limbaugh avoided
degradation of the societal interest injustice by allowing for the possibility of
reintroduction of the evidence concerning Bell's abusive behavior in the new
trial.
258. Raeder, supra note 223, at 936-37.
259. State v. Bell, 950 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. 1997).
260. 664 S.W.2d 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 230.
264. Id.









The concurring opinion in Bell sets the stage for the Missouri courts to
adopt the residual exception in criminal cases. Although it focuses on the
requirements of necessity and trustworthiness, it would be premature to assume
that other requirements considered at length by the courts of other jurisdictions,
namely satisfaction of the interests of justice, advance notice, materiality, and
probativeness, would not be used by the Missouri courts in establishing viable
thresholds in their future decisions regarding the exception.
Because the issue of the residual exception to the hearsay rule was not
addressed previously by the Missouri Supreme Court, and because the
authorities in other jurisdictions are split on this issue, this concurring opinion
offers significant guidance for Missouri courts attempting to apply the exception
in the future. The Bell concurrence clearly invites the lower courts to entertain
the issue. It seems almost certain that should an appropriate case knock at the
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